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Abstract
This paper discusses urban politics in contemporary Turkey through a particular
architectural phenomenon: that of minarets without mosques. Local administrations
under neo-liberal Islamists propose urban regeneration projects which require exten-
sive demolitions in squatter areas. Yet, their reluctance to tear down minarets creates
ruinscapes in which minarets seem to have miraculously survived destruction. In
this regard, the minarets without mosques should be understood as symptoms of
urban transformation led by neo-liberal Islamism. Neo-liberal Islamists envisage
these projects as spatial forms of politics of convergence, juxtaposing slum upgrad-
ing with luxurious housing within the unifying cultural codes of Islam. It is pro-
posed to interpret these minarets not as bearers of religious symbolism but as nodes
within the urban network of everyday life referring to Lefebvre’s concept of rhyth-
manalysis. Viewed in this way, it becomes possible for the minarets to take on new
meanings and serve as signs of the displacement of the squatters.
Similar to other architectural types that have
symbolic power, the meanings embodied
within the mosque cannot be reduced to its
practical function in worship; and the min-
aret bears the representative weight of these
meanings. There is a tension between the
functional origin of minarets as high plat-
forms from which the call for prayer is voca-
lised and the symbolic aspect of the minaret
as a synecdoche of Islam in general.1 Viewed
by both Muslims and Islamophobes as
the signifier of the discursive power of
the mosque, the minaret becomes a
supplementary sign of religious references
attached to the space of worship.
Moreover, the structural relation
between the mosque and the minaret is not
organic; that is, a mosque without a min-
aret is not an incomplete edifice. The struc-
tural unconnectedness between the mosque
and the minaret opens room for new possi-
bilities. One outcome of this dissociation is
the construction of mosques without min-
arets, which is not an uncommon sight in
European cities with Muslim populations.
The mosque without its minaret emerges as
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a religious space that has given up its claim
to public visibility and acknowledgement
(Pieterse, 1997). The most recent case reviv-
ing the architectural politics of the mosque
was the Swiss prohibition of minarets in
2009 (Betz and Meret, 2009; Ronis, 2010). A
significant element expressing the anti-
minaret view was a famous poster showing
the Swiss flag, on which minarets were
erected—incidentally reminding one of mis-
siles. The sinister shadows of the minarets
cast on the flag dramatised the invasion of
the country by Islam. The curious aspect of
the poster, which is relevant to my discus-
sion, is the depiction of the minarets as free-
standing objects. The minaret is detached
from its mosque, which in fact is the raison
d’eˆtre for its existence. This imagery con-
structs precisely what my object of analysis
is: the minaret without a mosque.
How shall we interpret a minaret without
its mosque? I will try to answer this question
through the case of present-day Turkey—a
cultural context in which Islam is currently
an important political force. Through a dis-
cussion of the minarets without mosques in
urban districts undergoing redevelopment
in the Turkish capital of Ankara, I argue
that these free-standing minarets embody
two radically different iconographies. On
the one hand, the minaret, as I have already
mentioned, is a ‘symbol’ of Islam; therefore,
Islamist municipal administrations refrain
from destroying them although their mos-
ques are demolished together with other ele-
ments of the built environment in these
neighbourhoods. On the other hand, the
minarets are the ‘symptoms’ of the everyday
patterns of urban life in the demolished
squatter neighbourhoods. Their survival as
the physical remainders of these perished
patterns becomes a component of urban
politics under the conditions of a neo-liberal
urban regime coupled by Islamic cultural
politics. I will attempt to theorise the quoti-
dian role of the minarets with reference to
Lefebvre’s concept of ‘rhythmanalysis’ and
discuss the politics of the minarets without
mosques in relation to Benjamin’s interpre-
tation of ruin and history. A particular case
that I will discuss is an on-going urban
regeneration project in Ankara, since the
lonely minarets standing on its site have
become the trademark of the project in the
public eye.
Neo-liberal Islamism and the
Minaret from Symbol to Symptom
‘‘The minarets are our bayonets, the domes
our helmets/ The mosques our barracks and
the faithful our army’’. These verses had cost
Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, the current Prime
Minister of Turkey and the leader of the
pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party
(JDP), a short prison-term and more impor-
tantly a life-long political ban in 1998. The
ban was later lifted with a change in the law,
and it became possible for him to run for
Parliament and finally be named Prime
Minister. However, the poem and its quota-
tion by the Turkish Prime Minister were
often used by his political opponents and
recently brought up in support of the cam-
paign for the Swiss minaret ban (Kern, 2009;
Khan, 2009).
The iconography of the mosque has
always been a hotly debated topic in Turkey.
The republican history has been marked by a
radical version of secularism defined by
strict state control of the religious domain;
yet the mosque has always been a site rela-
tively immune from control. Since it is an
actual space that has an important place in
the everyday lives of practising Muslims, a
total prohibition of the mosque was out of
the question. Hence it has been the most
powerful symbol for the political manifesta-
tions of Islamism. Islamists have often raised
demands such as the reconversion of Hagia
Sophia into a mosque, the building of
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spectacular mosques in symbolic locations
such as Taksim in Istanbul (the largest
square of the city) and Cxankaya in Ankara
(the district where the Presidential Palace
is).2
The political iconography of the mosque
requires an historical understanding of
Islamism as political power. It has to be
understood not as the manifestation of a
religious power unchanged in time, but as a
contemporary ideology compatible with his-
torical circumstances. In the case of Turkey,
the Islamist opposition successfully adapted
itself to the dynamics of neo-liberalisation
which gradually became dominant after the
1980s. I am using the term ‘Islamism’ here to
refer to a political ideology. In this respect, it
is different from Islam as a religion and its
‘Islamic’ cultural manifestations (Cxınar,
2005; see also Go¨le, 2000).
Some scholars have argued that the rise
of Islamic groups to power necessarily ends
up in their moderation and that, in the case
of Turkey, the Islamic movement ceased to
be Islamist as the result of a compromise
with the secularist state (Yavuz, 2009, pp.
5–13). Rather than essentialising the rela-
tion between Islamic movements and the
state in the form of an inevitable modera-
tion, I propose to consider the particular
form of interaction between Islamist poli-
tics and the historical dynamics that give
way to the Islamists’ rise to power. Viewed
in this way, the establishment of a govern-
ment by Islamist cadres does not necessarily
end up in either the existence of an (hidden
or overt) agenda to transform the state
structure into a theocratic one or the total
abandonment of Islamist political views.
The issue is rather the reorganisation of
civil society in Islamic terms to the extent
that the economic relations allow. In this
regard, I believe it is appropriate to define
the particular strand of pro-Islamic politics
of the JDP as neo-liberal Islamism, since
this particular combination served the
consolidation of neo-liberal hegemony
through the Islamic institutions within civil
society (Tug˘al, 2009). The party’s gradual
rise to power was the result of the mobilisa-
tion of the masses against the deprivation
created by neo-liberalism, yet they were
paradoxically resubjected to the same
system afterwards.3 Although a detailed dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this paper,
the 10-year JDP rule in Turkey witnessed
the utilisation of controlled mass mobilisa-
tion as the engine of neo-liberalisation
(Tug˘al, 2009, p. 4).
The Islamists’ rise to power in Turkey in
the past two decades started at the level of
local administrations. Most of the major
Turkish cities were taken over by Islamist
mayors who were then members of the
Welfare Party (WP), in 1994. From then
on, the political influence of Islam gradually
increased primarily through the municipal
policies of the WP. It is crucial to note that
the Islamist movement has gone through a
significant transformation in the 1990s.
This was a result of, on the one hand, the
military intervention in 1997 and, on the
other, their experience in local and central
governments leading them to reconciliation
with the market if not with the state. After
the outlawing of the WP in 1998 and its
successor the Virtue Party (VP) in 2001, the
Islamists split into two fractions. While the
older generation maintained the radical
Islamist discourse of the 1990s, the younger
generation led by Erdog˘an established the
Justice and Development Party (JDP). The
JDP broke away with the anti-capitalist,
anti-Western discourse and embraced an
agenda of democratisation in the face of
constant threat from the military. From
then on, the JDP strengthened its hegemony
through the zealous fulfillment of neo-
liberal market demands and a populist wel-
fare system utilising Islamic social net-
works. The neo-liberalisation of urban
economy was balanced with a municipal
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welfare system distributing a significant
amount of aid in the form of household
goods to the urban poor (White, 2002;
Bug˘ra, 2007). I define this particular model
as the urban politics of convergence.
Here, convergence should not be under-
stood as a narrowing of the income gap
between the urban classes. On the contrary,
this system brings closer different class
positions within the same hegemonic net-
work by using Islamic values, particularly
the Islamic approach to poverty.4 Up until
the 2000s, the Islamist groups interpreted
the traditional Islamic teaching of patience
as an anti-capitalist praise to poverty. Yet,
under the JDP, it rapidly turned into a
means of producing consent to the existing
economic order.5 The religious community
leaders still taught the poor to bear poverty,
which now functioned as an indirect sup-
port to the government’s economic policies.
The most important economic mechanism
to support the politics of convergence was
the deployment of the welfare system as a
tool of capital accumulation. The supply of
goods to be distributed to the urban poor
from the local market integrates not only
the squatters but also the petty producers,
dealers, power brokers and even in-city
transport companies with this power net-
work, at the centre of which rests the muni-
cipality. Although I will not go into the
details, this system has recruited a large
body of supporters for the WP-VP and
eventually resulted in the JDP’s rise to
power in 2002 (Batuman, 2012).
Meanwhile, urban space had become a
significant means of capital accumulation
during the same period (U¨nsal and Kuyucu,
2010; Batuman, 2012). The role of urban
development in neo-liberalism has been
discussed extensively (Harvey, 1989;
Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Hackworth,
2007). In tune with these trends, urban pol-
itics took a drastic step in terms of the pro-
duction of space in Turkey after 2002. In
2004, urban regeneration became a legal
term in Turkish legislation. In brief terms,
the municipalities and the Housing
Development Administration were granted
immense powers that allowed them to co-
operate in the redevelopment of old squat-
ter areas. These two agents also have the
authority to determine expropriation rates
for squatter homes. The squatters are forced
either to leave the area with the amount
they are given or to use it as downpayment
and take loans to own a new home in the
same area. This new model meant the end
of the traditional pattern of urbanisation in
Turkey, which rested on the populist over-
looking of squatting (Keyder, 1999). Now
market dynamics were extended to the per-
ipheries and a total commodification of
urban space was in order (Keyder, 2010;
U¨nsal and Kuyucu, 2010).
In this fashion, vast areas have been desig-
nated as renewal zones in all of the Turkish
cities in the past seven years. And it is within
this context that the minaret emerges as an
urban artifact that assumes new meanings
other than its traditional iconography. The
Islamist modernisers of the JDP propose
large urban regeneration projects which
require extensive demolition in urban areas.
Yet, their reluctance to tear down minarets
creates ruinscapes in which minarets seem
to have miraculously survived destruction.
To begin with, a minaret surviving the
demolition of its mosque is an expression of
deference to Islam. It is the predicament of
an urban renewal process led by an Islamist
local administration. A particular urban area
has been the object of a renewal project; the
housing stock, together with the social and
cultural facilities—including the mosques—
are demolished. Yet, the minaret, precisely
because it is seen as the bearer of religious
symbolism, is immune from destruction.
This, in turn, creates a contradiction on the
part of the authorities who desire to use
urban regeneration as a tool of total
4 BU¨LENT BATUMAN
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transformation. In this regard, the minaret
without its mosque appears as the symptom
of renewal. The modernist will of the munic-
ipal administration instrumentalises urban
regeneration to exert power in the city. The
limits to the immense powers invested in the
municipality are not defined by exterior
powers restraining it (such as laws, regula-
tions, etc.), but by the cultural codes inher-
ent within it: the minaret as the untouchable
symbol of Islam. In other words, the urban
texture resists Islamist regeneration with
Islamic representations of space. These min-
arets could only be demolished when they
are replaced with newer (and larger) mos-
ques (and minarets) erected on the same
locations. This means the continuity of cer-
tain urban elements within the renewal
process.
The minarets without mosques are found
in redeveloped squatter areas; they represent
the spatial practices that had existed within
the scale of a neighbourhood. The regenera-
tion projects, however, propose different
living patterns and distinct user profiles for
these areas. Being working-class neighbour-
hoods, these areas are characterised by par-
ticular daily routines including public
transport timetables, frequent use of com-
munal spaces and the primacy of walking
within the neighbourhood. The result of
gentrification, in contrast, minimises inter-
action among neighbours, introduces private
cars which are used not only for commutes
between home and workplace but even for
shorter distances within the neighbourhood.
For instance, the image we see in Figure 1
shows the old squatter area of Cxukurambar
which has been transformed into a wealthy
Islamic quarter where some of the members
of the Parliament reside today. Within this
transformation, the humble mosque of the
squatter neighbourhood was demolished to
make room for the new boulevard passing
through the district in 2005. The minaret of
the mosque stood within the lawn of the
eight-floor apartment building along the
boulevard for more than three years. It was
torn down only with the rising of the minar-
ets of the much larger district mosque built
in an adjacent lot in 2009. Incidentally, the
new mosque was accompanied with a hous-
ing unit including three high-rise residential
blocks. The juxtaposition of the traditional
architecture of the large mosque and the
modernism of the high-rise blocks provides
a fine illustration of the peculiar form of
urban regeneration under neo-liberal
Islamism. Although Islamic representations
of space are reproduced as ideological sig-
nifiers of power, the everyday lives in the
new housing complexes predominantly
populated by pro-Islamic residents reveal a
level of negotiation with modern urban
practices. What is crucial here is that the
spaces of both everyday uses and ideological
display are incorporated within the political
economy of redevelopment.
Similarly, there is a single minaret in the
Dikmen Valley regeneration area which has
been left in a building site for more than
two years. The regeneration of the Valley,
which runs for 13 km, was designed in five
phases. While the first two phases were fin-
ished by the early 1990s, the third phase was
realised by the Islamist local administration.
The site of the third phase of the project was
cleared in 2005 and the small neighbour-
hood mosque was the only structure left in
the area. The mosque was demolished in
2009 when the high-rise luxurious residen-
tial blocks towering over it were finished.
The small local mosque has been substituted
with a new one located by the high-rise
blocks. While the new mosque is a semi-
private space within a gated community, the
minaret of the old mosque still stands at the
valley bottom. In both Cxukurambar and
Dikmen, the spatial practices represented by
these minarets—that is, the role of the
mosque within the daily routines of the
squatters—have become obsolete.
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The power of the minaret to resist urban
renewal stems from the symbolism it embo-
dies. Yet, fitting the urban meaning(s) of
the minaret into its religious symbolism
means pushing urban life into a narrow
domain of politico-religious representa-
tions. The minaret is loaded with meanings
deriving from its role in everyday practices
beyond its religious iconography. In order
to explore such meanings, it is necessary to
analyse the mosque as a node within the
network of everyday life in the city.
The Rhythmanalysis of the Minaret
Everyday life, by definition, signifies the
ordinary; it contains patterns born out of
practices in endless repetition. This set of
insignificant patterns, however, is a major
component of the social structure; as
Lefebvre (1991, p. 87) has mentioned,
everyday life has ‘‘a secret life and a rich-
ness of its own’’. The analysis of everyday
life helps us to uncover the ideological con-
figurations of social relations, since every-
day life has a multilayered character, which
is a result of the overlapping repetitive
cycles. The attempt to analyse these cycles
should begin with their rhythms, since an
activity that leads to the interaction of time
and space inevitably produces rhythm
(Lefebvre, 2004, p. 15).
Lefebvre proposes a new methodology,
which he defines as rhythmanalysis. This
Figure 1. The single minaret in Cxukurambar stood within the lawn of an apartment building
until a large mosque was built in the adjacent lot.
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interdisciplinary field of knowledge, for
Lefebvre, should explore the natural/biolo-
gical rhythms together with artificial/social
ones. The objective of rhythmanalysis is to
dig out the repetitive patterns of move-
ments, gestures, behaviours, situations and
differences and to reach at a clear grasp of
the everyday life made of linear and cyclical
rhythms. If we follow Lefebvre, it is crucial
to look beyond the apparent iconography of
the minaret and search for the everyday
rhythms that it takes part in. Only then will
it be possible to uncover the representations
the minaret embodies within the context of
daily practices. These representations are
the products of visual, physical and acoustic
rhythms that the minaret defines in urban
space. Especially in residential areas, due to
lower building heights, the minarets con-
struct a visual rhythm that defines a scale
within the texture of the built environment
(Figure 2). The basic unit that defines this
scale is the walking distance, which also cor-
responds to the size of the community shar-
ing each mosque space. The mosque is used
in different cycles by different users: while
some users visit it five times a day, others
go to the mosque once a week for Friday
prayers and some others do so only twice a
year at the Bayram prayers.6 The minaret is
also the focus of an acoustic rhythm that
comes out of the repetition of the call for
prayer five times a day. Moreover, the call
for prayer is broadcast from many minarets,
yet without synchrony. This shows us that
rhythm is not necessarily monotonous or
even harmonious; the rhythms of everyday
life display multiplicity of rhythms (poly-
rhythmia), their harmony (eurhythmia) or
disharmony (arrhythmia) (Lefebvre, 2004,
p. 16).
Within rhythm, space and time are expe-
rienced through a particular pace, that of
spatial practice. The triviality of everyday
life expressed with repetition leads to an
impression that there is no change; the
velocity of transformation is zero. The per-
ception of cyclical time and the recurrence
of spatial experience conceal the rhythms of
everyday life behind the image of monoto-
nousness. The experience of urban renewal,
on the contrary, is a condensation of space
and time; the velocity of transformation is
high. Furthermore, the municipal authority
as the agent of renewal wishes to maximise
the pace of redevelopment. It is desired to
Figure 2. A typical residential cityscape in Ankara, in which the network of minarets is
clearly visible.
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achieve both the physical reconstruction
process and the socio-cultural transforma-
tion that accompanies it within a short
period of time.
At this instance, the minaret without a
mosque emerges first of all as the sign of
the erased patterns and rhythms of daily
practices. The network woven by the minar-
ets in a squatter area displays the embedd-
edness of religious routines in everyday life.
Moreover, the minaret without a mosque is
the sign of the juxtaposition of not only
two different times (the past and the pres-
ent) but also two different temporalities
and two different urban velocities. While
the temporality of everyday life in the
squatter area rests on daily cycles, urban
renewal and its high velocity present the
transformation from the past to the present
as a linear progress. The permanence of the
minaret, in this context, terminates this lin-
earity and constructs a condition of swing-
ing back and forth in time. In other words,
the single minaret suspends time in the eye
of its observers. The undemolished minaret
constantly refers to the past and the former
patterns of everyday life embedded in it.
Hence, the minaret creates an expanded
temporality referring simultaneously to the
demolished squatter neighbourhood and
the newly erected housing blocks. That is,
the new everyday life, thanks to the minaret
without a mosque, is defined by polytem-
porality, a present time containing the past
in it.
Nevertheless, it is not only the destroyed
rhythms of everyday life that the single min-
aret represents. The minaret, the mosque of
which has been demolished, inevitably
reflects the violence that characterises urban
renewal. The minaret without a mosque is a
minaret torn off from its mosque. In this
respect, the minaret is the remainder of a
vanished whole; it is the ruin of a mosque.
According to Benjamin, the ruin is a symbol
of ephemerality in relation to history
(Benjamin, 1990, pp. 177–182). The corro-
sion of time over space materialises in the
ruin, which in return assumes the power to
revive the past within the present. At this
point, architecture, in addition to being a
component of human experience at the
present time, makes it possible to imagine
the past through the traces it carries and the
corrosion it displays. What is crucial here is
the dialectics of the ruin as remainder. The
ruin simultaneously represents decay as a
negative process and the positive persistence
within this very process. It has collapsed
under the overwhelming pressure of time,
but also managed to survive it. In this
respect, the ruin is the signifier of the power
that destroyed it. The minaret as ruin, then,
is the signifier of the destructive power of
urban renewal for the former residents of
these neighbourhoods as well as those criti-
cal of the destruction caused by urban
regeneration operations.
A Field of Minarets: North Ankara
City Entrance Project
I have already discussed the rhythm pro-
duced by the minaret in areas where build-
ing heights allow the minaret to be visible
from a distance. Although it is possible to
come across individual examples of minar-
ets without mosques in different parts of
Ankara, a striking setting of single minarets
allowing for their legibility is the site of the
North Ankara City Entrance project along
the road connecting the airport to the city
centre. The project was the prime example
of the urban regeneration endeavours of
the neo-liberal Islamists and set the guide-
lines for future examples. Since the road to
the airport was defined as a gateway to the
capital city, the project was presented as a
national undertaking. It was argued that
the facades of this prestigious urban axis
display ‘the nation’ to the ‘foreign visitors’,
8 BU¨LENT BATUMAN
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hence it had to be cleared of the squatter
houses. The project was begun in 2004 with
a special law authorising the Ankara
Greater Municipality and the Housing
Development Administration to redevelop
the area. The evacuation of 30 000 people
and the demolition of 6500 squatter homes
were completed in 2005 and 2006. The eva-
cuation process was rather peaceful since
the squatters were promised that they could
move into their new homes in late 2007,
although none have moved in since the
buildings are not finished as of spring 2012.
It was planned to construct 8100 houses for
the squatters and 21 000 extra units to be
sold. A large section of the area was allo-
cated as an upper-class residential zone
with a vast recreational area (Gu¨mu¨sx,
2010). Since the area designated as a recrea-
tional zone is still empty, the single minar-
ets within this zone remain.
The project is a significant attempt at
developing a model for space production
compatible with the ideological choices of
neo-liberal Islamism. The power of the cen-
tral government was for the first time added
to the capabilities of the Islamist municipal
administrations in this project. In this
regard, the project can be compared with
the construction of a new district to shelter
the new government buildings of the young
republic and villas for the state e´lite in the
1920s (Batuman, 2009). Yenisxehir, literally
the new city of Ankara, was built on the
expropriated land across the railroad, which
until then served as the southern border of
the town. This new city rising on a tabula
rasa was seen as the site for the creation of
the symbolic locus of the republic. In the
following decades, the railroad continued to
act as the demarcation line separating the
poor north and the wealthy south.
Within this context, it is not surprising to
see the Islamists attempting to build a sym-
bolic alternative to southern Ankara, which
represented not only wealth but also the
republican ideology with the Presidential
Palace located on the southern hills over-
looking the city. In the 1990s, the northern
district of Kecxio¨ren, which has its own
administrative body, was treated by the
Islamists as the alternative to republican
Ankara with Islamic representations of space
and conservative daily practices (Sargın,
2004). While the newly built town hall was
decorated with designs reminiscent of
Ottoman and Islamic symbolism, the
municipality enforced an alcohol ban and
introduced gender segregation in urban
space.
In contrast to the radical Islamism of the
1990s, the neo-liberal Islamism of the JDP
came up with regeneration projects in tune
with the politics of convergence.7 The main
idea was to juxtapose slum upgrading with
luxurious housing. This was the dream of
neo-liberal Islamists; rich being rich and
poor being poor yet living side-by-side with
the shared identity of Islam. The poorest
residents of the district were quickly relo-
cated in the low-quality housing blocks
built further north and the squatters who
owned title deeds were promised apart-
ments within the project. These apartments
were to be built distant from the upper-
class residences and their recreational
areas.8 The aim of the project was defined
as ‘‘bringing a new interpretation and a new
definition to the city [of Ankara], which has
grown distant to the urban image defined
in 1923’’ (Ankara Greater Municipality,
2005). Although there is no reference to
Islam, it is clearly stated that the image of
the city was intended to be redefined, with-
out any clear indication of what the new
image would refer to. Moreover, with the
words of the mayor, this site would be ‘‘a
new living environment, every corner of
which would be under surveillance with
smart technologies’’ (Sabah Ankara, 12
March 2006). The prospect of convergence
of squatters, the loyal voters of the Islamist
MINARETS WITHOUT MOSQUES 9
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parties for two decades, and the new rich of
neo-liberal Islamism requires the strict con-
trol of urban space.9
If we turn to the current state of the site,
it is crucial to note that the multitude of
lonely minarets signifies the destruction of a
whole residential district and hence points
to the social aspect of demolition. The phys-
ical marks of the vanished daily practices
such as the distances between individual
minarets constantly refer to the inexistent
socio-spatiality as spectres of past urban
experiences in the present time. Put in this
way, the network of minarets without mos-
ques resurrects a spatial pattern that previ-
ously existed in the squatter district.
Interestingly, the Housing Development
Administration seems to have embraced the
single minaret as the symbol of the project.
A large signboard with the acronym of the
organisation was erected near a minaret on a
small hill close to the road. Thus, these min-
arets are not seen as temporary defects to be
corrected with replacment mosques and
minarets. On the contrary, they are utilised
as a component of the project’s emblem,
representing the Islamist power executing it.
Moreover, a new mosque is located on the
hilltop facing the road. The new structure
defines the silhouette together with the
unfinished high-rise blocks. In other words,
although the textual representations of the
project never refer to Islam(ism), the minar-
ets fulfill this task through their silent
presence.
The unusual scene created by the single
minarets has led to discussions from the
moment it emerged. While journalists often
asked the authorities why the minarets were
left on the site, vague answers generally
defined it as an attempt to avoid future
accusations of building too many mosques
(by recording the number of the mosques
with the minarets). It was often considered
that the minarets were not demolished
because it would be a ‘‘sin to do so’’ (Tempo,
2006). Oppositional media saw this as an
Islamist statement suggesting that ‘‘every-
thing can be demolished, except for the min-
aret’’ (SOL, 2008). The phenomenon was
also discussed by the residents of the area on
Internet forums. While some forum users
asked others of their opinions and whether
they had information regarding these min-
arets, others responded with comments,
speculations or rumours. Most of the com-
ments referred to the holiness of the minaret
and affirmed the act, while some posted the
explanations of the authorities. There were
even posts citing rumours that the minarets
would later be maintained as landscape ele-
ments in the recreational area.10
The Visual Representation of Urban
Destruction
The visual experience of the minarets along
the Airport Road is not limited to their
observation from the road. The spectacle of
minarets is also visually constructed via
photographic representation and circulated
in public. The pair of photographs in
Figure 3 composes the paradigmatic repre-
sentation of the North Ankara City
Entrance project. This pair of images was
used for the first time in a book introdu-
cing the urban regeneration projects of the
Housing Development Administration
(Bayraktar, 2006). After that, it was fre-
quently reproduced in the publications of
the Ankara Greater municipality. It was
reproduced from time to time in the
weekly bulletin of the Municipality to
report the recent developments regarding
the project. Moreover, new photographs of
the project site were added to this set to
emphasise progress. The photographs
become operational tools within the social
process of urban renewal through the
meanings they produce. They work for the
legitimisation of the creative destruction
10 BU¨LENT BATUMAN
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prompted by the municipality. The use of
these photographs as a pair tells us about
the differences between them, hence the
transformation of the district. The photo-
graphs do not depict before and after
images of the project, since it is not fin-
ished yet. What they show is the before and
after conditions of the first phase—that is,
the evacuation. The swiftness of physical
demolition implies the peacefulness of eva-
cuation as a social process. Moreover, rapid
demolition promises rapid construction;
the hardest chapter of renewal is already
completed as witnessed by the photo-
graphs.11 The modernist agent of renewal
has finally attained its tabula rasa, the
photographs tell us; it is only a matter of
time before the project is realised.
Nevertheless, what is true for every rep-
resentation is also valid here: representation
cannot guarantee the coherence of meaning.
There is always the possibility of an excess
of meaning failing the intentions of the
(re)producers of the images. Here, while the
municipal authority uses these photographs
as the illustration of a clean slate, they can
easily be interpreted as images of devasta-
tion. In this regard, they can be seen as
related to a different genre of photographic
representation—that of aerial reconnais-
sance photographs. The aerial views of the
project site significantly resemble that of a
bombed area and the ruined areas look like
a scarred landscape after destruction.
During the Second World War, an
important task of aerial photography was
documentation of damage done by bomb-
ing raids (Deriu, 2007). The crucial feature
of this imagery is the depiction of destruc-
tion from a distance, which functions to
render the human tragedy invisible. The
detached gaze of the airborne camera turns
Figure 3. The pair of photographs frequently used by the authorities to represent the North
Ankara City Entrance project.
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social catastrophe into abstract visual pat-
terns. The aerial reconnaissance photo-
graphs deploy various representational
strategies which produce distinct effects.
While high verticals show two-dimensional
abstract patterns, low obliques allow for
perspectival vision and depict the actuality
of destruction. While the former records
the extent of devastation, the latter allows
the viewer to differentiate between the
standing structures and the destroyed ones.
If we return to the images of the renewal
area in northern Ankara, what we have at
hand are low oblique views intended to dis-
play the vanishing squatter houses. Yet, the
destruction of the houses needs to be
viewed from a particular distance so that
the human details reminding us of the fact
that the destroyed structures are actually
homes are not detectable. That is, the
representational strategy is based on a
point of view which is distant enough to
conceal the social dimension of destruction
and close enough to show its physicality.
In any case, the constant element in
these images initially displaying change is
the minarets without mosques. Hence, the
photographs inevitably highlight these
architectural elements that survived demoli-
tion. Their survival, as mentioned earlier, is
an outcome of the municipality’s respect
for Islamic values. The public circulation of
these images is a silent manifestation of the
Islamic character of the community life
expected to be created via the project.
Nevertheless, the minarets are also relict fea-
tures of the everyday life of the squatter
neighbourhood. Since the minaret is a sig-
nifier of the spatial practices in the neigh-
bourhood, its survival passes the traces of
past everyday life on to the present. The
minarets pinning down the places of reli-
gious practice confirm human experience.
Hence, the minaret as the signifier of every-
day life troubles the strategically chosen
distance which conceals the social aspect of
destruction.
While the physical existence of the min-
arets as free-standing objects will eventually
come to an end with the completion of the
project, the photographs make it possible to
register permanently the meanings pro-
duced by their solitude. Without doubt, the
meanings produced by these images will
multiply in time due to the context within
which they are viewed. The squatters evacu-
ated from the area currently live in different
districts in northern Ankara as (temporary)
tenants. It is possible to observe their dis-
content regarding the delays in the project
through the Internet forums they use to
communicate. A quick tour through the
pages of a nation-wide popular forum web-
site (wowturkey.com) shows that the resi-
dents of the area have started discussion
topics on the project. Under one of these
topics, more than 200 users have posted
around 1700 comments about the project.12
The early messages displayed a high level of
optimism despite the apparent delay as of
2008 and 2009. The users shared digitally
produced images of the project and photo-
graphs of the construction site with excite-
ment. These optimistic exchanges eventually
gave way to bitter comments and com-
plaints, not only about the delays, but also
about the indifference of the authorities
towards their hardship.
There is also a forum website specifically
established on the North Ankara City
Entrance project in 2008. The site currently
has 1214 users and it has been visited more
than 180 000 times in three years.13 In 2009,
it was proposed for the first time in these
forums to establish an organisation to
pursue the legal rights of the displaced
squatters; yet this suggestion did not get a
positive response. This was due on the one
hand to the spatially dispersed condition of
the squatters and on the other to their
unwillingness to confront the authorities,
12 BU¨LENT BATUMAN
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for fear of losing the rent aid they received.
In December 2010, a meeting was arranged
to this end and an organisation was formally
established in September 2011. The first
action of the organisation was suing the
municipality and the Housing Development
Administration, demanding compensation.
The struggle of the squatters even found an
echo in the Parliament: the opposition party
(the Republican People’s Party) formally
requested an explanation from the Prime
Minister regarding the delays in the project.
Within this context, the photographs that
used to represent the willful co-operation of
the squatters begins to take on a new mean-
ing. The squatters’ renunciation of their ear-
lier consent abolishes the optimism implied
by successful evacuation and signifies their
temporary-yet-continuous displacement
over the years.
Urban renewal—that is, the transforma-
tion of the squatter area into a different type
of housing—is presented as progress via the
photographs showing the consecutive stages
of transformation. This use rests on a linear
notion of history supported by the sequen-
tial order of photographs taken in time. The
photographs present an image of urban
regeneration grasped within the linear con-
tinuity (hence necessity) of history, moving
from the old to the new. Yet, this image
requires the consent of the squatters to be
socially operational. If the attachment of the
squatters to the site through their homes
(even though they are long gone) is recon-
structed, the representations of the built
environment open up room for new ways to
historicise the urbanisation process. In this
context, the minarets without mosques
imply the possibility of a different reading
and a different historical conception of
urbanisation for they carry the memory of a
past urban condition within the present.
This is in tune with Benjamin’s (2003, pp.
391–395) call for a historical materialism
setting out ‘‘to explode the continuum of
history’’ by ‘‘tak[ing] control of a memory,
as it flashes in a moment of danger’’. The
image of the minarets stripped of their mos-
ques is a ‘picture of the past’ to be experi-
enced in the present, since the struggle on
urban renewal is a struggle over meaning.
Once the minaret is appropriated as an
index of everyday life aside from its religious
connotations, it becomes a potential tool for
historical consciousness regarding urban
life; especially for those seeking ways to
resist gentrification projects. This is only
possible by viewing the minaret as a spectral
testimony to the erased urban condition and
not as the materialisation of religious ideol-
ogy. The image of the minaret without a
mosque displays traces of the past in the
present time; hence—to borrow Benjamin’s
term—it explodes the historical claim of
urban renewal as progress. As Benjamin
would say, the claims of linearity of time
and of historical necessity are political; they
belong to the victors. The minarets without
mosques, in contrast, may serve to destroy
the temporality of urban renewal and the
creation of a different history of urban
politics.
Conclusion
The North Ankara City Entrance project
praised itself for ‘‘not aggrieving’’ the squat-
ters. In this respect, the failure of the project
to be finished on time is already a testimony
to its failure. This should also be under-
stood as the failure of the initial objective of
the project to serve as a model of urban
renewal in tune with the urban politics of
convergence. The project was an attempt
spatially to converge the urban poor and
the new Islamist e´lite. With the evacuation
of the area, the minarets without mosques
became visible and soon turned into the
emblematic signs of the project in public
perception. This was also in accord with the
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intentions of the authorities, since it was
not desired publicly to announce the proj-
ect as an Islamist undertaking. Instead, the
minarets served as silent signifiers of
Islamism, not as newly erected statements
but as relicts of what was already there: as
testimonies to the inherent Islamic charac-
ter of the area. In a sense, the minarets rep-
resented the authorities’ interpretation of
the squatter district: a community held
together through the network of minarets.
This network also represents the one and
only feature that the authorities deemed fit
to be transferred to the imminent commu-
nity of convergence. Shared practices (and
spaces) of Islamic faith would serve as the
ideological apparatus to build a new urban
realm, an alternative to the capital city of
republican modernism. In this regard, the
minarets function as anchors to implement
the project on the actual site.
Nevertheless, the minarets are not merely
religious signifiers but also the ruined
traces—the remains—of the displaced
social practices. While they are representa-
tional symbols, they are also architectural
elements recalling the past. This duality is
precisely the reason why they should be
understood as the symptom of the project’s
failure. As Islamic symbols they are expected
to provide the link between the rich and the
poor, not only metaphorically but also phy-
sically with the shared spaces of a harmo-
nious community. Yet this mythical vision
rises over the ruins of the squatter homes as
witnessed by the minarets themselves. The
existence of the minarets is the sign of the
prolongation of the displaced lives of the
squatters. That is, while they are intended to
act as tools to converge the two separate
social groups spatially and discursively, they
turn into markers of the limits to the poli-
tics of convergence. The urban strategy of
neo-liberal Islamism rests, on the one hand,
on the production of space through maxi-
misation of rent and, on the other, on the
framing of the social spaces with Islamic
representations. In the case of the North
Ankara City Entrance project, the Islamic
representations—the minarets—ended up
as signs of the displacement of the squatters
desperately struggling to attain their homes.
Notes
1. For an analysis on the origins and the polit-
ical history of the minaret, see Bloom
(1989).
2. Most recently, Prime Minister Erdog˘an
declared that a mosque—‘‘among the larg-
est in the world and . visible from every-
where in the city’’—was planned to be
constructed on a hilltop in Istanbul
(Radikal, 2012).
3. For details of the neo-liberal economic poli-
cies pursued by the JDP, see Cizre and
Yeldan (2005), Yıldırım (2006) and Sarıca
(2011).
4. Obviously, the Islamic values were not the
sole determinant in the JDP’s success in
gaining the consent of the lower classes. For
the political economy of the cross-class alli-
ance that the JDP managed to constitute,
see O¨nisx (2006).
5. Through his observations in Sultanbeyli
where he conducted fieldwork, Tug˘al com-
ments that ‘‘workers still talked frequently
of patience in 2006, but now they patiently
accepted the reigning economic order,
rather than patiently and quietly rejecting it
like in 2001’’ (Tug˘al, 2009, p. 224).
6. The Bayram prayers occur during the Eid
al-Fitr at the end of Ramadan and the Eid
al-Adha celebrated approximately 70 days
after the Eid al-Fitr.
7. It has to be noted that the mayor of the
Ankara Greater Municipality was the mayor
of Kecxio¨ren until he won his current seat in
1994. In his third term in office, which cor-
responds to the period 2004–09, he clashed
with his successor in Kecxio¨ren, although
both of them were elected from the JDP.
The party did not renominate the mayor of
Kecxio¨ren in 2009, since he was seen as the
representative of radical Islamism. For a
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similar clash between the neo-liberal Islamism
of the JDP and the radical Islamism of the ear-
lier period in Sultabeyli, one of the foremost
Islamist districts in Istanbul, see Tug˘al (2009).
8. While they are waiting to return to the area
and move in to their new homes, the squat-
ters are living as tenants in different loca-
tions and are being paid monthly rent aid
of approximately US$150.
9. The relocated squatters are subject to rules
and regulations rearranging the rhythms of
their everyday practices. In the new hous-
ing complexes they are introduced with
written rules prohibiting the ‘‘misuse’’ of
the environment such as the spread of
indoor activities (cooking, hosting guests,
growing vegetables, etc.) to the outside
and the violation of the clear-cut differen-
tiation of public and private spaces. These
rules conflict with the former patterns of
everyday life for some of the squatters and
result in their being frequently warned by
the security staff. For the frustrating
experiences of the former residents of the
North Ankara City Entrance Project area,
see Erman (2011). For a similar case in
Bezirganbahcxe, Istanbul, see Uzuncxarsxılı
Baysal (2009).
10. For examples of such discussions see the
‘‘North Ankara City Entrance Project’’ at:
http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=
23823andstart=10 (last accessed 5 October
2011).
11. It is interesting to note that these photo-
graphs were often accompanied by photo-
graphs showing the squatters happily
demolishing their own homes. For an
example, see Bu¨yu¨ksxehir Ankara 233, the
weekly bulletin of the Ankara Greater
Municipalty, 17–23 June 2009.
12. See: http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.
php?t=23823 (last accessed 5 October 2011).
13. See: http://www.kuzeyankara.net/forum/ (last
accessed 5 October 2011).
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